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Recent Decisions
tude of vindictiveness and retribution is shifting to a more enlight-
ened, humanitarian stance, and the goals of incarceration are now
rehabilitative and corrective, not penal. But the decision taken by
this Court could hardly be described as one which will be conducive
to re-incorporating the ex-offender into society as a full and partici-
pating member. Ideally, these issues should be raised and settled by
the legislature, but it is naive to suppose that state legislatures
across the country are going to take the time and effort to alter
existing legislation, and in many cases repeal and draft constitu-
tional amendments, when their constituents care little for the lot of
the ex-offender. In turning its back on the ex-felon and denying him
the only realistic path for redress of his grievances, the Court makes
a mockery of the concept of rehabilitation, leaving the "mark of
Cain" indelibly impressed upon the ex-offender for life.
Anne M. Nelson
MONOPOLIES-COMBINATION AND CONSPIRACY-INDUCING GOVERN-
MENT ACTION- CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-RIGHT
OF PETITION-The United States Supreme Court has held, in
a private action under the Clayton Act, that a cause of action
was stated where it was alleged that a group of interstate motor
carriers conspired to monopolize trade and commerce in the trans-
portation of goods by engaging in concerned activities to institute
actions in state and federal courts and agencies to resist and defeat
plaintiff's applications for operating licenses.
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S.
508 (1972).
The respondents, highway carriers in California and plaintiffs
below, filed a civil action under section 4 of the Clayton Act.' They
sought injunctive relief and damages against petitioners, who are
1. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendent resides or is found or has an agent, without
respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
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also highway carriers operating within, into and from California.'
The amended complaint alleged that petitioners had conspired to
put respondents and other competitors out of business. It was
claimed that petitioners had combined their financial and other
resources to carry out a systematic and constant program of bring-
ing actions before the California Public Utility Commission, the
Interstate Commerce Commission, and the courts. They allegedly
opposed every one of respondents' requests or applications for certi-
fication under the public convenience and necessity provisions of
the California Public Utilities Act,3 appealing any ruling of that
agency to the courts, all "with or without probable cause and re-
gardless of the merits of the case."4
It was further alleged that, for this purpose, petitioners contri-
buted to a special trust fund according to their respective yearly
incomes, regardless of a contributor's interest in any particular ap-
plication or request made by respondents.5 Respondents finally al-
leged that petitioners' actions had deprived the courts and agencies
of necessary facts and information, and that petitioners had de-
feated respondents' applications and requests only by their combi-
nation and conspiracy to oppose all such applications.
The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action.7 The circuit court of appeals reversed.'
PRIOR CASE LAW
The two principal precedents in this area of antitrust law are
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc.' and United Mine Workers v. Pennington.10 In Noerr, the Su-
preme Court, for the first time, dealt with the applicability of the
Sherman Act" to the combined efforts of members of a trade or
2. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 509 (1972).
3. CAL. PUBL. UTIL. CODE §§ 1061-73 (West 1956).
4. 404 U.S. at 512.
5. Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transp. Co., Trade Cas. 72,298 at 84,740
(N.D. Cal. 1967).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 84,746.
8. Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transp. Co., 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1970).
9. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
10. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1970) provide in pertinent part that:
§ 1 Every contract, combination . . .or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
Vol. 13: 145
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business to influence governmental action detrimental to their com-
petitors. Noerr and other trucking companies complained that the
railroads had financed a publicity campaign aimed at obtaining
governmental action adverse to the business interests of the truck-
ers.' 2 The Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Black, reversed
a judgment in favor of the trucking companies. The Court's opinion
was based on the premise that no violation of the Sherman Act "can
be predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or en-
forcement of laws." 3 There is no violation of the Sherman Act where
the restraint results from valid governmental action rather than
private action."
In holding that the railroads' combined actions aimed at influenc-
ing legislative or executive action in regard to a law did not violate
the Sherman Act, the Court explained that: (1) such an association
and the resulting restraint would be dissimilar from the activity
traditionally prohibited by the Sherman Act; (2) holding such activ-
ities violative of the Sherman Act would impair the ability of the
government to act in its representative capacity by deterring the
among the several States, or with foreign nations is declared to be illegal ....
§ 2 Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to nionopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of
a misdemeanor ....
12. The Court noted:
The gist of the conspiracy alleged that the railroads had engaged [a public relations
firm] to conduct a publicity campaign against the truckers designed to foster the
adoption and retention of laws and law enforcement practices destructive of the truck-
ing business, to create an atmosphere of distaste for the truckers among the general
public, and to impair the relationship existing between the truckers and their custom-
ers. The campaign . . . was described in the complaint as "vicious, corrupt, and
fraudulent," first, in that the sole motiviation behind it was the desire on the part of
the railroads to injure the truckers and eventually destroy them as competitors . . .
and secondly . . . the publicity matter circulated in the campaign . . . was largely
prepared and produced by [the public relations firm] and paid for by railroads.
365 U.S. at 129-30.
The complaint also contained specific allegations of instances of the railroads' attempts to
influence the passage of legislation, and a charge that the railroads had succeeded in persuad-
ing the Governor of Pennsylvania to veto a measure known as the "Fair Truck Bill," which
would have allowed truckers to carry heavier loads on Pennsylvania roads. Id. at 130.
13. Id. at 135.
14. The bases of such a rule:
[R]est upon the fact that under our form of government the question of whether a
law of that kind should pass, or if passed be enforced, is the responsibility of the
appropriate legislative or executive branch of government so long as the law itself does
not violate some provision of the Constitution.
Id. at 136.
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incentive of people to freely inform the government of their wishes;
and (3) a contrary construction would raise serious constitutional
questions concerning the right of petition protected by the Bill of
Rights.'"
The Court then considered whether the railroads' actions consti-
tuted a violation of the Sherman Act in spite of the announced
principle. It held that the legality of the railroads' attempt to influ-
ence governmental action was unaffected by any anti-competitive
purpose they may have had." The Court added that the Sherman
Act "condemns trade restraints not political activity"' 7 such as a
publicity campaign aimed at influencing governmental action. That
business competitors are directly affected by later governmental
action does not render such activity illegal. The Court, however,
limited the sweep of its holding, noting that, where a campaign
ostensibly aimed at influencing governmental action is a mere sham
to cover what is nothing more than an attempt to directly interfere
with the business relationships of a competitor, the Sherman Act
would be violated.19
In Pennington,0 the Supreme Court further expounded on the
scope of its holding in Noerr.3' The Court held improper the trial
court's instructions which permitted the jury to find a violation of
the Sherman Act if they found that the mine workers and large coal
operators had an anti-competitive purpose in their approaches to
the Secretary of Labor or the Tennessee Valley Authority.22 The
15. Id. at 136-38.
16. Id. at 139-40.
17. Id. at 140-41.
18. Id. at 142-44.
19. Id. at 144.
20. The action was filed by the trustees of the United Mine Workers of America Welfare
and Retirement Fund against respondents to recover overdue royalty payments. Respondents
filed a cross claim against the mine workers and certain large coal operators supplying the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). They alleged that the mine workers and large operators
had combined and conspired to persuade the Secretary of Labor to establish minimum wages
under the Walsh-Healey Act and to persuade the TVA to curtail spot market purchases which
were exempt from the Walsh-Healey Act in an effort to drive the respondent and other small
operators out of business. 381 U.S. at 659-61.
21. Id. at 669-72.
22. The Court also rejected the circuit court's holding that Noerr applied only if the
conduct was:
[U]naccompanied by a purpose or intent to further a conspiracy to violate a statute.
It is the illegal purpose or intent inherent in the conduct which vitiates the conduct
which would otherwise be legal.
Id. at 669-70. quoting Pennington v. UMW, 325 F.2d 804, 817 (6th Cir. 1963).
Vol. 13: 145
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Court held that Noerr shields any concerted effort to influence pub-
lic officials regardless of intent or purpose.z
THE DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT COURTS' TREATMENT OF THE CASE
The district court viewed respondents' complaint as raising the
sole issue of whether petitioners' association to bring proceedings
before the regulatory agencies, without any other alleged anti-
competitive conduct, violated the antitrust laws by reason of peti-
tioners' anti-competitive purpose and intent." Relying on the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the district court held that respondents'
complaint failed to state a cause of action.25 In so ruling, the court
rejected respondents' contentions that: (1) the Noerr-Pennington
rule only applied to activities directed at the executive or legislative
branches of the government;26 (2) petitioners' conduct fell within the
sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington rule;2 and (3) petitioners'
conduct fell within the scope of the patent cases which have held
23. The Court added that:
Joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though
intended to eliminate competition. Such conduct is not illegal, either standing alone
or as part of a broader scheme itself violative of the Sherman Act.
381 U.S. at 670.
24. Trade Cas. 72,298 at 84,740 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
25. The court, relying on the rationale announced in Noerr, said:
[T]he Supreme Court has resolved the problem of bad purpose or intent vis a vis
freedom of resort to public officials and agencies by holding that the latter is to be
subserved notwithstanding the risk of tolerating an anti-competition purpose of such
resort and a possible anti-competitive result.
Id. at 84,744.
[Tihe Supreme Court has in effect weighed these factors in balance with the factor
of the antitrust intent or result of certain kinds of concerted activity and has concluded
that the latter factor must be risked in order to subserve other governmental needs and
political rights.
Id. at 84,742.
26. The district court held:
[T]his Court is of the opinion that the rationale of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is
clearly and equally applicable to activities directed to courts or to regulatory agencies
The right of access to the courts and regulatory agencies is just as much a political
right as the right of access to the legislative and executive branches.
Id. at 84,743, citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963).
27. The court noted that one of the exhibits attached to respondents' brief showed that
petitioners had been successful in 21 of 40 matters before the agencies or courts. The court
took this fact to suggest that at least some of the petitioners' claims had merit and were not
shams. Trade Cas. 72,298 at 84,744 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
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that patent infringement suits brought to restrain competition or
create a monopoly violate the Sherman Act."
The circuit court reversed for two reasons. First, it rejected the
application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to concerted actions
aimed at judicial and administrative adjudicative bodies; 9 and sec-
ond, it ruled that, even if the Noerr-Pennington doctrine applied,
the complaint stated a cause of action within the sham exception
to the rule.30 The court also disagreed with the district court's rejec-
tion of respondents' reliance on the patent cases. It noted that the
significance of those cases was not that they were based on patent
rights, but rather that litigation was used to restrain trade.3' The
circuit court expressed the belief that its ruling would not impede
the willingness of people to make known their wishes in any "legiti-
mate sense," nor would it impair the operation of the agencies or
"deprive the government of a valuable source of information. '3
THE DECISION BY THE SUPREME COURT
Justice Douglas delivered the opinion for the majority of the
Court. After reviewing the basic principle it had announced in
Noerr,3 the Court adopted the district court's view that the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine applied to group approaches to the administra-
28. Id. at 84,745-46. Respondents had contended that petitioners' concerted actions were
within the scope of the holdings in United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963)
(concerted action related to applications before the patent office, among other things, vio-
lated the Sherman Act); and Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952)
(plaintiff's bringing of patent infringement suits for the purpose of extending its monopoly
violated the Sherman Act). The district court rejected this contention because the instant
actions were not based on patent rights.
29. The court stated that the rationale of Noerr-Pennington immunized actions otherwise
unlawful on the premise that the responsibility for enacting laws creating trade restraints and
the responsibility for enforcing such laws rested with the legislative and executive branches
respectively, and hence constituted a restraint resulting from legislative or executive action.
That rationale, however, was not applicable to judicial or administrative adjudicative pro-
cesses because it was not the function of the courts or the adjudicative branch of the agencies
to determine whether laws will be adopted or enforced. 432 F.2d at 758-59.
30. The court held that where respondents alleged that petitioners' real purpose -and
intent was to restrain trade directly rather than indirectly through the medium of governmen-
tal action, they could prevail under the sham exception in Noerr. The court also said that
petitioners' efforts to support as effectively as possible all their actions could not override
their primary purpose of directly restraining competition. The fact that a valid basis existed
for some of their opposition was irrelevant. Id. at 760-63.
31. Id. at 760.
32. Id. at 762, citing Noerr, 365 U.S. at 139.
33. 404 U.S. at 509-10.
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tive agencies and the courts.14 The Court, however, held that the
allegations in respondents' complaint came within the sham excep-
tion in Noerr -
In looking at the nature of the activities engaged in, the majority
noted that there was a fundamental distinction between the present
case and Noerr. Here, petitioners' actions were aimed at blocking
respondents' meaningful access to the agencies and courts and
usurping the decision-making process; 31 in Noerr, the railroads
merely attempted to influence officials in the executive and legisla-
tive branches. 7 The majority also noted that the filing of sham
actions did not impose a sanction and was not regulated by the
Sherman Act, but that similar conduct before the adjudicative bod-
ies could result in a prohibited sanction .3 Although the line may be
difficult to draw, when a pattern of "baseless, repetitive claims"
emerges, indicating an abuse of the adjudicative process, such ac-
tions "cannot acquire immunity by seeking refuge under the um-
brella of 'political expression.' ,,31
Whether respondents' first amendment rights were infringed by
petitioners' alleged purpose to deny them meaningful access to the
agencies and courts was not decided by the Court; 40 the Court, how-
34. The Court held that:
[Tihe right to petition extends to all departments of the Government. The right of
access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.
... [The Court added] that it would be destructive of the rights of association and
of petition to hold that groups with common interests may not, without violating the
antitrust laws, use the channels and procedures of state and federal agencies and courts
to advocate their causes and points of view respecting resolution of their business and
economic interests vis-a-vis their competitors.
Id. at 510-11 (citations omitted).
35. Id. at 513, 516.
36. It was alleged that the result of petitioners' actions "was that the machinery of the
agencies and the courts was effectively closed to respondents, and petitioners . . . became
'the regulators of the grants of rights, transfers and registrations' to respondents-thereby
[diminishing respondents' ability to compete.]" Id. at 511 (citation omitted).
37. In distinguishing Noerr, the Court said:
In the present case . . . the allegations are not that the conspirators sought "to influ-
ence public officials," but that they sought to bar their competitors from meaningful
access to adjudicatory tribunals and so to usurp that decisionmaking process.
Id. at 511-12.
38. Id. at 512-13. The Court cited as examples: perjury; the use of a patent obtained by
fraud to exclude a competitor, Walker Process Equip. Co. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp.,
382 U.S. 172, 175-77 (1965); and conspiracy with a licensing authority to exclude a competi-
tor, Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707 (1961).
39. 404 U.S. at 513.
40. Id.
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ever, did note, in regard to petitioners, that first amendment rights
are not immune from regulation when they are part of a scheme to
violate a valid statute.4
The majority recognized: (1) that all carriers had the right of
access to the agencies and the courts in order to defeat applications
by their competitors for certificates as carriers; and (2) a carrier's
intent and purpose to eliminate a competitor-applicant by denying
him meaningful access to the adjudicative bodies may be implied
from that opposition. The majority held that a combination or con-
spiracy to deter a competitor's "free and unlimited" access to the
agencies and courts and to deny those rights by "massive, concerted
and purposeful activities," violated the antitrust laws.42 It was im-
material that the means used were, in themselves, lawful.43
Justice Stewart filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Bren-
nan. He viewed the Court's opinion as a retreat from Noerr and an
infringement on first amendment rights.4 Justice Stewart rejected
what he termed "the majority's inference" that respondents' com-
plaint alleged any kind of fraud or misrepresentation by petitioners
in the proceedings before the agencies and courts. Without such
conduct, he saw "no difference, so far as the antitrust laws and the
first amendment are concerned, between trying to influence execu-
tive and legislative bodies and trying to influence administrative
and judicial bodies."45 He also viewed the Court's statement that a
joint agreement to exercise the right of petition is not necessarily
immune from the antitrust laws as irreconcilable with the principle
announced in Noerr.46
Although Justice Stewart disagreed with the reasoning of the
court, he concurred in the result. He believed that the allegations,
when viewed most favorably for respondents, entitled them to prove
that petitioners' real intent was to directly interfere with
respondents' business relationships, thus violating the antitrust
laws. 7
41. Id. at 514-15, citing Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1948) (an
injunction can be issued under a state statute banning secondary boycotts), and Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1944) (freedom of the press does not encompass the
freedom to combine to restrain others from publishing).
42. 404 U.S. at 515.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 516. Justices Powell and Rehnquist took no part in the decision.
45. Id. at 517.
46. Justice Stewart read the Noerr case to explicitly hold "that the joint exercise of the
constitutional right of petition is given immunity from the antitrust laws." Id. (emphasis
original).




The majority and concurring opinions reaffirm the application of
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to group activities before the execu-
tive or legislative branches of government. The application of that
doctrine in the instant case, however, suggests a subtle and
unarticulated retreat when the group activity is aimed at a judicial
or adjudicative body. The retreat is sound and necessary. It is based
on the realization that while group activity aimed at legislative or
executive action may produce an indirect restraint, such actions
before judicial or adjudicative tribunals almost always yield an
immediate and direct restraint. Any restraint produced by a cam-
paign before the legislative or executive branches, if successful, is
the result of governmental action, and such a restraint is not prohib-
ited by the antitrust laws if the governmental action is valid. A
similar campaign, however, before an adjudicative body, such as the
California Public Utilities Commission or the Interstate Commerce
Commission, does not depend on success or subsequent governmen-
tal action; it results in an immediate and direct restraint by denying
meaningful access to the adjudicative bodies. In its analysis, the
majority emphasizes that the determinative factor in the applica-
tion of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is whether the restraint re-
sulting from the group campaign is direct or indirect. There is no
immunity from the antitrust laws for a direct restraint. An indirect
restraint, on the other hand, is immune under the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine.
The Court's decision, which effectuates a balancing between the
constitutionally protected right of petition and valid governmental
action to protect the public interest, is not without precedent in the
first amendment or patent areas. It has long been recognized that
the first amendment freedoms are not absolute. The Supreme Court
has recognized the government's right to enact and enforce neces-
sary regulatory measures in the proper setting,4" and it has held that
[Tihe respondents are entitled to piove that the real intent of the conspirators was
not to invoke the processes of the administrative agencies and courts, but to discourage
and ultimately to prevent the respondents from invoking those processes. Such an
intent would make the conspiracy "an attempt to interfere with the business relation-
ships of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would be justified."
Id. at 518 (citations omitted), with UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-70 (1965), supra
notes 22 and 23.
48. In NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 443-44 (1963), the Court held: "Resort to the
courts to seek vindication of constitutional rights is a different matter from the oppressive,
1974
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patent infringement suits cannot be used as a means of obtaining
an unlawful monopoly." As a result of its recognition of the
distinction between direct and indirect restraints, the Court con-
cludes that interference with a competitor's access to the adjudica-
tive bodies could constitute a direct interference with the competi-
tor's business relationships and therefore violate the antitrust laws.
This conclusion obviates any need to consider first amendment
claims the parties may have raised. It is consistent as well with the
well-established rules that protected activities cannot be used for
the sole purpose of violating a valid statute,0 and that a constitu-
tional question will not be decided if the record presents some other
ground on which the case may be decided.5 1
The Court's opinion also attempts to deal with the troublesome
practical application of the sham exception involving group activi-
ties before the adjudicative bodies. The problem is magnified be-
cause the group's primary intent and purpose is determinative of
whether the Sherman Act has been violated; yet, it may well be that
an attempt to determine a group's primary intent is a difficult, if
not impossible, task for the fact finder. After recognizing that any
attempt to obtain a decision adverse to a competitor's application
is almost always an implicit attempt to eliminate that applicant as
a competitor, 2 the Court implies that proof of the type of activities
malicious, or avericious use of legal process for purely private gain."
Substantial regulatory interests are valid when it is shown that "[slubstantive evils [are]
flowing from petitioner's activities .... " Id. at 444; accord, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen
v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
49. In Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416, 424 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 837 (1952), the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held: "[W]e must
not permit the courts to be a vehicle for maintaining and carrying out an unlawful monopoly
which has for its purpose the elimination and prevention of competition." The court rejected
the assertion that to allow recovery of damages would be a denial of free access to the courts.
50. Petitioner's first amendment rights are limited by the Court's holdings in United
States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548; 556 (1973); and
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 404 U.S. 508, 514-15 (1972). In the Letter Carriers case
the Court held that the provision of the Hatch Act prohibiting political activities by civil
servants was not prohibited by the first amendment or any other provision of the Constitu-
tion. The Court reasoned that this provision was reasonable and in the public interest and
that respondents' right of petition was not infringed.
51. Since respondents claim was decided on the basis of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,
there was no need for the Court to consider the potential first amendment question raised
concerning an infringement by petitioners of respondents' right of petition. The Court's
preference to avoid constitutional questions has been well established; e.g., Rescue Army v.
Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947).
52. 404 U.S. at 515.
Vol. 13: 145
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engaged in by the railroads in Noerr would not be immune if en-
gaged in before the adjudicative bodies. 3
The Court, in wrestling with a similar problem in patent cases,
has held that proof that a patent was obtained by fraud or misrepre-
sentation would strip the patent owner of his immunity unless his
good faith were shown; 4 that the institution of sham patent in-
fringement suits was evidence of an unlawful intent to monopolize
commerce;55 and that evidence of at least one sham lawsuit must be
shown."8 In spite of the difficult standard of proof, however, the
instant case has been cited as authority in remanding recent cases
for trial on the merits.57 Clearly, the Court struck a balance, as in
the past,58 in favor of the interest protected by the antitrust laws,
in spite of the possibility of numerous vexatious suits questioning a
group's primary intent.
The majority's opinion in this case is somewhat of a retreat from
the posture the Court adopted in Noerr and Pennington.59 The
breadth of the immunity created by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine
has been narrowed when that doctrine is applied in an adjudicative
setting. While the Court does not expressly narrow the immunity
established under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the majority does
expressly lower the standard of proof necessary to meet the sham
exception when the action involves an adjudicative tribunal. Fur-
ther, the majority's reference to the decisions in the patent cases,6"
as well as to Noerr and Pennington, indicates that petitioners' good
faith would be a complete defense to respondents' claims of illegal
intent.
53. Id. at 513.
54. Walker Process Equip. Co. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
55. Lynch v. Magnavox Co., 94 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1938); accord, Darden v. Besser, Trade
Cas. T 68,646 at 72,602 (E.D. Mich. 1956).
56. Ronson Patent Corp. v. Sparklets Devices, 112 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Mo. 1953).
57. Gulf States Util. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 411 U.S. 747, 752 (1973); Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 380 (1973); Rogers v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 492
F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3707 (U.S. May 8, 1974).
58. Walker Process Equip. Co. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
"[TIhe interest in protecting patentees from 'innumerable vexations suits' [cannot] be used
to frustrate the assertion of rights conferred by the antitrust laws." Id. at 176. Contra, Eastern
R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136-38 (1961).
59. Joint efforts to influence public officials, even though intended to eliminate competi-
tion, were immune from the antitrust laws.
60. See Walker Process Equip. Co. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965);




The instant case is significant for several reasons. First, it estab-
lishes a limitation on the application of the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine to group activities and campaigns before judicial and quasi-
judicial bodies. Secondly, in establishing this limitation, the Court
defines the effect, direct or indirect, of such activities as the key
factor in determining whether such conduct violates the antitrust
laws. And finally, the Court suggests a definitive standard of proof
for determining whether the sham exception of the doctrine applies
when there is a group campaign before adjudicative bodies. The
instant case reaffirms in principle the holdings in Noerr and
Pennington that business competitors can unite in the exercise of
their right of petition, and may do so as long as their primary pur-
pose is the exercise of that right and not the restraint of competition.
At the same time it sounds a warning to groups or associations
contemplating concerted activities before adjudicative bodies.
Daniel M. Darragh
TORTS-IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY-DOCTRINE OF INTERSPOUSAL IM-
MUNITY-MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT OF 1893-PRE-MARITAL
TORT-SEPARATE PROPERTY-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
reaffirmed the doctrine of interspousal immunity, rejecting the ar-
gument that an unliquidated tort claim is separate property within
the meaning of the Married Women's Property Act, despite the
fact that the tort was committed prior to coverture.
DiGirolamo v. Apanavage, 454 Pa. 557, 312 A.2d 302 (1973).
The doctrine of interspousal tort immunity precludes suit by one
spouse against the other spouse to recover monetary damages for
injuries caused by the actor-spouse's negligence. You may "always
hurt the one you love," but that does not necessarily imply that the
injured party will always find adequate avenues for compensation
within the processes of our judicial system. A recent Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decision, DiGirolamo v. Apanavage,' has reaffirmed
1. 454 Pa. 557, 312 A.2d 382 (1973).
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